their energy for much longer
and can inflict injury quite far
away from the explosion. Due
to this extended range, most
types of fragmenting AP
mines have the option of tripwire detonation, which enables
the mine to go off when a person or vehicle trips a wire up to
10 metres (33 feet) away.
A person is at risk in two different ways while travelling in
an SUV. If the vehicle detonates
an AP device that works primarily through blast, the distance from
the expected impact point (below
a wheel) to the person in the vehicle
is normally high enough to create a safe
distance. However, if the device creates
fragments, the thin steel of the car body
will offer almost no protection against the
high-velocity steel fragments. The standard
car-body steel is 0.8 millimetre (0.03 inch)
thick and will not prevent fragments from
entering into the cabin.
To express it another way, when we are
talking about various AP devices, the main
concern for passengers in a vehicle is fragmentation rather than the shock or blast effect from the explosive.
For that reason, in an area with a high
risk of setting off fragmenting AP ammunition, fully armoured SUVs are recommended. However, apart from being very
costly, excessively heavy and hard to obtain in sufficient numbers, fully armoured
SUVs tend to give the wrong impression
of the humanitarian workers—namely
that they are not willing to take the same
risks that the inhabitants must take on a
daily basis.
As an alternative to fully armoured vehicles, there are a number of retrofit solutions
on the market today that can provide a good
level of protection for passengers travelling
in soft-skinned vehicles. Although retrofitted vehicles do not provide the same level of
protection as factory-armoured SUVs, some
can work well against a large number of ERW
threats for about one-twentieth the price of
a fully armoured vehicle. Consequently, a
much higher number of vehicles—and thus
passengers—can be protected for the same
money. In addition, the retrofit solutions to
protect soft vehicles, like ballistic blankets
(described below), can be delivered quickly
and most can be installed in the field.
Built-in Ballistic Blankets
Most retrofit solutions to protect
SUVs are based on aramide fabric, such as
Twaron® or Kevlar®, which is the ballistic
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material used in most body armour. By using flexible armour, it is possible to design
solutions that fit into the curved interior and
floor of the SUV.
In terms of level of protection, flexible solutions using aramide on the interior
and floor of the vehicle generally represent
a lower level of protection than those found
on the sides of a factory-armoured SUV.
Ballistic blankets are available from several
sources and are a system of tailor-cut and
overlapping blankets that cover as much of
the interior of the vehicle as possible up to
the windows.3
Ballistic blankets offer a good level of
protection against fragments coming from
below or from the lower sides. They are installed below the carpet and inside the side
panels and doors and require a complete
stripping of the vehicle. After reinstallation, the interior of the vehicle looks the
same as before, with no visible signs of it
being protected.
The protection level of the blankets is
normally specified according to a North
Atlantic Treaty Organization standard
STANAG [Standardisation Agreement]
29202 and the standard level by most nongovernmental organizations is a level referred
to as 600 m/sec. It is not possible to connect
this level directly to any specific mine or
grenade as the actual conditions have an
enormous influence on the real threat.
However, a level of 600 m/sec can be directly compared to other means of protection; for instance, standard body armour
(without vest-insert plates) represents a level
of protection of 450 m/sec and contains only
about half the amount of ballistic material.
A passenger in a vehicle that hits fragmenting ERW is much better off if the vehicle is
equipped with ballistic blankets than if he
is wearing body armour; in addition to a
higher ballistic level, the ballistic blankets
will offer protection of the extremities and
not only the torso.
Interestingly, compared to a fully armoured SUV,3 many soft-skinned vehicles
equipped with ballistic blankets are better
protected against landmines detonating on
the ground. The reason for this seeming inconsistency is because most armoured SUVs
are designed with a level of floor protection
according to an old German standard for
armoured limousines known as the “two
hand grenades” level. Unfortunately, the
specified grenade—the German type
DM51—is quite small and contains relatively small fragments that are easily stopped.
In addition to blankets, various systems
exist on the market to shield the passengers
from fragments.

Explosive Remnants of War and
Their Consequences
This article examines the post-conflict situation of Tajikistan, which has not only anti-personnel
Ballistic blankets.

New technologies with in-the-field armouring options can be fitted and removed
when there is no immediate danger. This
type of protection is designed to provide an
increased level of protection against ERW
and other weapons that explode next to
the vehicles. The increased availability of
these options improves the safety potential
for vehicles working in proximity to ERW.
In turn, these options and those developed
and implemented in the future will continue to better the working conditions of
personnel exposed to such risks.
See Endnotes, page 109

mines but various kinds of explosive remnants of war. Recently Tajikistan signed Protocol V1
of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons,2
which includes a commitment to clear the nation’s ERW.
The author highlights some of the different sources of
ERW in Tajikistan as well as the progress being made by
authorities to clear and destroy ERW.
A group of houses in close proximity to a mine danger zone.
ALL PHOTOS COURTESY OF CLEAR PATH INTERNATIONAL

by Jonmahmad Rajabov [ Tajikistan Mine Action Centre ]
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orldwide, landmines and unexploded
ordnance kill and maim approximately
20,000 people annually, one third of
them children.3
In recent years, the international community has
not paid serious attention to the risk posed by the UXO
problem (i.e., explosive ordnance that is used during
armed conflict but fails to detonate). It is impossible to
accurately count the number of uncleared mines and it
is also uncertain how much UXO remains. However, it
is believed the total number of items of UXO, no matter the type, greatly exceed the total number of mines.
UXO and other explosive items such as abandoned ordnance (all grouped together under the term explosive
remnants of war) continue to appear in huge numbers in
previous areas of conflict. Some countries, like Laos and
Vietnam, are more affected by UXO than mines.
Nowadays the international community is paying
more serious attention to the risks posed by the UXO
problem. This is reaffirmed by the adoption of Protocol
V to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.
The adoption of Protocol V on 28 November 2003 was
possible thanks to governments acknowledging the seriousness of the post-conflict problems posed by UXO as
well as the necessity to minimize the risk and impact of
UXO. Tajikistan ratified Protocol V on 20 December
2005, and the Protocol entered into force for all parties on
12 November 2006. In accordance with the Protocol, the
term ERW encompasses UXO and abandoned explosive
ordnance in conflict areas. This Protocol obliges the conflicting parties, as well as States Parties, to be responsible

with regard to all UXO under their control. Tajikistan also has a landmine problem
and has ratified the Ottawa Convention.4 Together, these two documents stipulate
that after active military fighting ceases, countries should mark and clear the mines
as well as liquidate and destroy all mines and UXO under their control.
Impact of ERW in Tajikistan
In addition to the landmine problem, items of UXO also pose a great challenge
in Tajikistan. It is presumed that most ERW remains in the country due to the
civil war (1992–1997). The UXO in Tajikistan that remains on the ground is the
result of being fired from military planes and helicopters, as well as shelling. A
large number of Tajik citizens have consequently died or been seriously injured.
It is necessary to note that items of UXO also appear in the country for reasons
unrelated to war, including armed violence and attempted revolts. In Tajikistan,
as in many other countries, mandatory military service requires continued and
regular military training for the Armed Forces. It has been the case in Tajikistan
that during training, some shells have been fired and accidentally landed outside
the military training zone. These shells remain unexploded in areas where access
to the public remains open, putting the local population at risk.
Since the implementation of the Tajikistan Mine Action Programme, the manual mine-clearance teams and survey teams have found and destroyed more than
700 pieces of UXO. A majority of the ERW were found in the central region of
the country where fighting took place during the civil war. Until the ERW are removed from these areas, they will continue to pose a great risk to the population.
In Tajikistan, despite the ERW problem, civilians go about their daily business
and continue to find themselves in dangerous areas, at times receiving injuries.
For example, in February 2006, two teenagers—brother N. Yorov, 15, and sister
M. Yorova, 16, from Besimas village in Hissor district—were injured by a UXO
explosion while cutting wood. N. Yorov’s leg was seriously injured and his sister
received injuries to her stomach. Due to the lack of financial means, the family
was unable to provide necessary medical care for the teenagers, which has greatly
hampered their recovery. An investigation into the cause of this explosion revealed
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»

In March 1993, two brothers—Bahriddin and Nuriddin Eshonov, ages 18 and 17—found a
piece of ERW and began to open it. This action resulted in an explosion and the brothers
were both killed.

»

On 23 July 1993, 11-year-old Khusrav Rafiyev found an item of UXO and tried
to burn it. The resulting explosion blinded the boy.

»

On 23 April 2005 two brothers—Salim and Mahmadali Saimuddinov, ages 8 and
9—and 5-year-old Fathiddin Ilhomiddinov from the village of Khost found a piece
of UXO while they were gathering wood. They began to cut it with an axe which
resulted in an explosion and all three of the boys were seriously injured.

Industrial Ammunition Stockpile
Recovery: Saving Energy and Resources
and Protecting the Environment
This article presents the opportunities for the disposal of ammunition in an economically and
environmentally feasible way, focusing on post-conflict disposal of larger stocks of ammunition
with a special view to the ongoing Ammunition Stockpile Destruction Programme in Afghanistan

that the piece of UXO had been just beyond
the limits of a local military training area.
No other source of UXO contamination was
identified in this case.
A similar accident happened to Z.
Urazov, 15, an inhabitant of Rudaki district.
Having found a piece of UXO while tending animals in the community grazing area,
he lost his right hand and eye as a result of
the explosion.
Additional examples of incidents involving ERW are noted in the brief stories at the
top of the page. These are clear indications
of continuous suffering in the Rasht and
Tavildara areas where ordnance was fired
from aircraft during the civil war.
Collection and Demolition of ERW
Tajikistan, as State Party to both the
Ottawa Convention and Protocol V of
the Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons, takes all the necessary measures
to find and demolish mines and ERW.
On 2 December 1994, the President of
the Republic of Tajikistan issued the Decree
on Voluntary Surrender and Recapturing of
Fire Arms and Military Ammunitions from
the Population. This decree became an instrument for disarming illegal armed groups
and recapturing firearms that remained in
the hands of the civilian population. Table 1
shows the number of firearms returned from
1994 to 2006.

Kalashnikov gun

9,101

Pistol

2,846

Rifle

3,970

Other types of guns

1,042

Hunting gun/ERW

9,906

Total

26,865

Table 1: Firearms returned between 1994 and 2006.
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managed by the Afghanistan New Beginning Programme. The contents of the article are based
provisions by State Parties. TMAC hopes
the implementation of Protocol V allows
all parties to take practical measures to demolish ERW efficiently and productively
to provide safety for all.
See Endnotes, page 109

on the experiences gathered under the umbrella of the research and development programmes
Western European Armament Group European Cooperation for the Long-Term in Defence and
European Union L’Instrument Financier pour L’Environnement (EU LIFE), together with a study
carried out for NATO’s Maintenance and Supply Agency, followed by field studies on ammunition
stockpile destruction in mine-action programmes.
by Erik K. Lauritzen, Mogens Straarup and Inés García Sánchez [ NIRAS DEMEX & NIRAS Chemcontrol ]

Two children walking along a dusty road.

In accordance with the agreement between the government of the Republic
of Tajikistan and the Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe dated
16 May 2005 and within the framework of
the Programme of Small Arms and Light
Weapons, an Explosive Demolition Centre
was established within the Ministry of
Defence. Its major objective is to facilitate
the demolition of ERW. More than 70 metric tons (77 tons) of ERW have been demolished as of 19 October 2006, and the work
is ongoing.
Conclusion
Taking the serious consequences of
ERW into consideration, it is necessary
to point out that the adoption of Protocol
V by the international community and its
entry into force has great importance for
the safety of civilians. Of course, it significantly depends on the process of accession
of the governments and the fulfilment of its
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bsolete ammunition is a major problem in many countries, especially
in war-torn countries like Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan and Lebanon. To
restore peace, it is imperative to dispose of the ammunition, as this will
reduce the capabilities to continue the warfare. Explosive remnants of war are
normally destroyed by open burning or open detonation (OB/OD) in suitable
amounts according to national regulations or according to International Mine
Action Standards 11.10 and 11.20.1 These methods create environmental problems,
however, as huge quantities of metal fragments, dust and nitrogen oxides (NOx) 2
are emitted to the environment.
Agenda for ERW and Ammunition Stockpile Disposal
As a result of the end of crises and conflicts around the world, vast quantities
of ammunition have been destroyed by OB/OD. They have come from a variety
of sources, primarily:
• Excess stocks of military ammunition resulting from the ending of
crises/conflicts
• Unexploded ordnance on former military training or gunnery ranges
• Mines and UXO remaining from military and some civil conflicts
The amount of ammunition in abandoned stockpiles in Iraq and Afghanistan
comprises several hundred tonnes of various types of munition.
In the wake of the recent conflicts in the Persian and Balkan areas, many
questions have been raised about post-war effects, such as the environmental
pollution caused by OB/OD of ammunition stockpiles. Kuwait has claimed
compensation from the Iraqi government for severe damage of the desert environment caused by chemical pollution of sand and soil because of OB/OD

disposal of abandoned Iraqi ammunition after the
First Gulf War in 1991.
Today the international market for scrap metal
is very favourable, and the prices of scrap iron and
especially copper, stainless steel and aluminium
are rising.
Recovery and recycling of explosives for industrial
use has not proven feasible. Recycled explosives from
ammunition are not competitive with industrially manufactured explosives. However, explosive compounds
might be incinerated for energy recovery or reclaimed
for fertilizing or other chemical purposes.
The clearance of abandoned ammunition stocks in a
post-conflict area, necessary logistics management and
implementation of appropriate ammunition-disposal
procedures require a lot of human resources. The work
related to ammunition-stockpile management is highly
suitable for demobilisation, demilitarisation and reintegration programmes.
Taking all environmental, economical and social
benefits derived from the recovery of ammunition stockpiles into consideration, industrial ammunition stockpile recovery is far preferable to the currently applied,
normal practice of OB/OD. However, further investigation and proof of concept is urgently needed.
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